Transcript: Is Europe battle-ready?

This is an audio transcript of the Rachman Review podcast episode: ‘Is Europe battle-ready?’

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Gideon Rachman
Hello and welcome to the Rachman Review. I’m Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator at the Financial Times. This week’s podcast is about security in Europe, as Russia gains momentum in the war in Ukraine and doubts grow about the future American commitment to Nato. My guest is Bastian Giegerich, the director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

So will Europe ever get its act together on defence and security? 

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News clip
The first few moments of the heinous, calculated attack. Many ran in panic. One small group tried to crouch behind a metal pillar, desperately hoping it and a few tables would shield them. 

Gideon Rachman
The attack on a Moscow concert hall has been widely blamed on the Islamist terror group Isis. But Vladimir Putin, Russia’s leader, has also strongly insinuated that Ukraine was involved in the attack. That’s led to speculation that he intends to further mobilise Russian society in an effort to make a breakthrough in the war in Ukraine. This past week has also seen intensified missile attacks on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. 

News clip
Russia has launched the first missile attack on Ukraine’s capital in recent weeks. At least eight people injured, as residential and industrial buildings were damaged. Air defence units in full action trying to repel the attack. Debris from intercepted missiles also falling in different parts of the city. 

Gideon Rachman
All this unfolded just after EU leaders had met in Brussels, with Ukraine and defence co-operation right at the top of the agenda. There’s a lot of talk about the need for Europe to do more on defence, but will there be action? Before I got to that question, I started by asking Bastian Giegerich about the terror attack in Moscow. Will it have any impact on the war in Ukraine? 

Bastian Giegerich
Well, I think the attempt, imagined as it is, to link the terror attack to action by the Ukrainian government certainly has the potential to mobilise parts of the Russian population, perhaps remove whatever restrictions that still exist on mobilisation, on bearing the cost of what is now the third year of the war. 

Gideon Rachman
And does this come at a time when things seem to be moving Russia’s way, at least incrementally? They’ve made some gains, and obviously there’s enormous concern about Ukraine’s ammunition supplies, future supplies from the US. So do you think Putin might feel that he can, to some extent, press home an advantage? 

Bastian Giegerich
Well, we’ve gone from optimism regarding Ukraine’s prospects to the — at the time — controversial scenario of a stalemate on the battlefield in the second half of 2023. And I think now for 2024, even stalemate is not guaranteed. And if western assistance does not ramp up and Russia continues to proceed in its war of attrition with no regard for cash or casualties, it’s, in my view, very plausible that Russia will make advances in 2024, and Ukraine might have to give up territory as a result. It’s important to point out that Russia can continue this war, at least according to IISS estimates, for at least another two years, probably more, before it will struggle to maintain its force structure and its equipment numbers. 

Gideon Rachman
And what do you think the parallel assessment is of Ukraine? What does the IISS think? Let’s say that America doesn’t resupply, how much trouble are the Ukrainians in?

Bastian Giegerich
Well, I think that will be a very dramatic development for Ukraine. I don’t think it means that Ukraine will stop fighting, but it means that the fight will look very different. And I think it will mean a much worse position for Ukraine. As I said, loss of territory — certainly not a position from which you would want to go into the second half of 2024 and then possibly into the next year of the war. 

Gideon Rachman
So there’s obviously, with this situation, the stalemate in Washington, a lot of talk now about the onus being on the Europeans to supply weapons. Is Europe capable of doing that? 

Bastian Giegerich
Well, I think Europe will not be able to replace the US in terms of direct military assistance to Ukraine in the short term. However, there are things that Europeans can do even in the short term. And one example we have just seen as the leadership of the Czech Republic and in particular its president, Petr Pavel, a former general, to get creative about mobilising needed resources — munitions in this case — around the world, and build a coalition to pay for it. That can be done.

I think the other immediate measure would be for Europeans to perhaps revisit their own national risk calculus. There’s still a lot in European inventories that could be provided to Ukraine. Further depletion of those inventories, of course, decreases the ability of those donor countries to defend themselves against aggression. And therefore so far, most, not all, donations have been quite modest in percentage of inventory terms. But I would say the war’s in Ukraine, the probability of that war coming to Nato territory increases if Ukraine loses and Russia wins. And if Europeans want to prevent that outcome, I think a greater acceptance of risk in the short to medium term, until replacements arrive to what has been donated should be considered. And in the long run, of course, if you’re talking about the long-term perspective for Europe, it is indeed about making today the investments that will lead to greater defence industrial resilience, greater defence industrial capacity, so that Europe can rebuild military capability to defend itself and deter aggression in the future. 

Gideon Rachman
So how big are those investments required? I mean, how much capacity does Europe have now? Or put in another way, how short of capacity is Europe, and how long will it take to get to the stage where they’re less dependent on a less dependable United States? 

Bastian Giegerich
Currently, I would say European armed forces are not structured, equipped, technologically enabled, funded, or exercised and trained to fight large-scale, high-intensity war and win against a major state-level threat such as Russia without US assistance. Now, dealing with small-scale limited attacks, in terms of scope and duration and so on? Yes, doable. Crisis management operations? Yes, also doable. But prevailing in major power war without any US involvement is a very different proposition. And what we’re confronted with now in Europe is the train wreck that has been defence policy for the past 25 years. No major European Nato country has the magazine depth, the combat support, the combat service support to fight a big and long war. And forces and industry both have been hollowed out by two to three decades of underfunding, when defence looked like an optional national activity, almost — one that can be trimmed, you know, thoughts of efficiency, of consolidation.

Now, I think it’s important to say that this was not a structural inevitability, but the result of political choices in many nations in light of the security environment that leaders faced at the time. So funding is an important part of it. Since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, according to IISS data, at least European Nato members have increased their defence spending by some 32 per cent and will continue to increase it more. So that arrow roughly is pointing in the right direction. Could that be, on the European level, greater collaboration, a better division of labour, you know, make those defence euros and defence pounds work a bit harder? Sure, that would help and there could be more of that. But the damage of the past 20-plus years will, in my view, take at least a decade to repair. And during that decade, a sustained and predictable uplift of defence spending will be required. 

Gideon Rachman
A decade? Because, you know, Europe may not have a decade. 

Bastian Giegerich
That’s true. I mean, the problems go so deep and are so wide that I don’t think there’s a short-term fix. So we have invited risk by not preparing adequately for the future. So I think it is true that over the next 10 years or so, Europe is in a position of vulnerability. How quickly Europe manages to close that vulnerability depends, of course, on the choices made now. And I would say they also depend on whether or not Ukraine succeeds in its defence against Russia. 

Gideon Rachman
Yeah. So what kind of investments? I mean, I’m sure you talk to European defence officials all the time. What kind of investments in your mind, in the mind of the IISS, has to do or such are most urgent to start with now? 

Bastian Giegerich
Well, I think one area that used to be a Nato strength, but then didn’t receive the investment that was required, and that’s quite obvious now, is integrated air and missile defence. I think that in terms of protecting population centres, protecting critical national infrastructure, protecting deployed forces, the utility of that is obvious. Electronic warfare is another example. Magazine depth in terms of munitions, stocks and holdings is important as well. Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. It’s actually a fairly long list. I think that list is actually fairly well understood. I don’t think it would surprise people, and it’s just a question of what can be done to accelerate work on filling those shortfalls. And they are quite significant. And therefore I think it will take quite some time and a sustained effort — that’s important, the sustained effort — not just a peak that then might ebb away again in one or two years, to address these shortfalls. 

Gideon Rachman
And is manpower also problem? Because I know that in the UK, for example, you turn on the TV any time, there are efforts to recruit people: join the army, join the navy. But the army, I think, is at its smallest size since the Napoleonic war, something like 70,000 people. Is this a recruitment problem — they can’t persuade people to join the armies and the navies? And is that a Europe-wide issue as well? 

Bastian Giegerich
Yeah, I think that recruitment and retention is a problem that armed forces across Europe are facing. It’s not a UK-specific problem, and I think you have seen already and will continue to see more and more people arguing for a return of some form of conscription, primarily to increase the pool from which professional soldiers could be recruited, and also to create a larger cohort of people who have at least some form of basic military training in case a mobilisation of some sort was required that would be available. So I think you will see those efforts. You will probably also see an effort to make better use and more creative use of reserves. But again, Israel and other countries show that that also has economic cost, and it’s hard to sustain that depending on what footing you think you’re on, whether this is a peacetime, a crisis or indeed we are at war already. So I think people will try to define creative ideas to get around this. But recruitment and retention is a problem. And several European nations have tried to grow their armed forces — Poland, Germany, a couple of others. Poland is perhaps doing a bit better, but for most countries this is a severe challenge. 

Gideon Rachman
And I mean, you talked about the possibility of conscription. It just strikes me that from what I know of European politics, that’s still, even for all the alarm over Ukraine, an incredibly tough sell. And, you mentioned Germany. I mean, people talk about the famous Zeitenwende and the change in mood and so on. Do you think that the change in mood has been big enough, say, in Germany, Europe’s largest economy, to really sustain both the spending and the recruitment that will be necessary? 

Bastian Giegerich
With regards to Germany, I am quite sceptical actually. I think the Zeitenwende, that famous paradigm change that Chancellor Scholz called for in February 2022, is at best incomplete. And I think in particular in the dimension that you are asking about — you know, the the mental shift, the societal resilience and the mindset that comes with it — I think that is actually where it hasn’t happened. So I think that will continue to be a problem. Germany, in some ways, is probably the country where the delta between, you know, the latent potential as a security provider for Europe and what it actually delivers is greatest, or at least of the countries that have the potential to move the needle for all of Europe. I would say the burden really is on Germany to step up. 

Gideon Rachman
European politicians are at least beginning to, as they say in Britain, talk a good game. I mean, defence was the issue at the European Council. Are you impressed by what they’re doing? Yeah? 

Bastian Giegerich
Well, if you’re looking at it from the view of the European Commission and look at the last couple of days, you will probably say that important progress was made — you know, a push to open lending from the European Investment Bank towards defence, the idea of using proceeds from frozen Russian funds and assets to support Ukraine, even though some EU member states did not want that money to be spent on weapons for Ukraine. But, you know, overall, a continuing trend to try and incentivise European collaboration in defence and a gradual expansion of the European Commission’s ability to regulate and fund and incentivise a part of the European defence equipment market. There has not been yet support for joint borrowing, the so-called euro bonds idea, for defence. Although some member states have been pushing that idea, France among them, they will probably feel that they’ve just got started on that debate. However, if you look at it from the perspective of Ukraine, all of these things are moving way too slow. The bottom line is that at this point, some 25 months into this war, Europeans are still not united around the idea that Russian aggression in Ukraine can and must be defeated. For now, Ukrainians are paying the price for this lack of European determination. So going back to your question, I would say progress was made, but not at the speed of relevance. 

Gideon Rachman
Do you think the idea of having a European commissioner in the European commission for defence — would have felt an incredible idea a decade ago — has a future, or is even that just sort of a bureaucratic shift, really, rather than anything important? 

Bastian Giegerich
I think it has a future. Even if you go back to what probably now is the origin of what we now refer to as the European security defence policy in the EU, a Franco-British push at the end of the ‘90s, you know, there was always that idea that maybe defence ministers would need to play a greater role. So in a way, it’s logical that we now might make this step.

I think the important part, though, was the balance of power between the European Commission and member states. Member states will look at initiatives from the commission, always with a degree of suspicion. Is the commission trying to expand its remit here? Is it trying to grab power that really should belong to member governments? And I think, you know, for member states, when they look at the European Commission, they see an institution. And when they think about what institutions should do, they will say, well, look, institutions are here to create a predictable framework for our interaction. They’re here to lower the transaction costs of our collaboration and help us achieve our goals really. And the more the commission is trying to develop its own agency, the more delicate the balance becomes. I do think, though, it is a gradual development, but I think it’s a relevant development. So if I were sitting in the European Commission, I would make sure that my initiatives are portrayed and driven with the spirit of implementing member-state agendas and aspirations in defence to provide that reassuring element that, you know, these things are really designed to help them achieve what they said they would want to do. And that includes providing an autonomous capacity for the security and defence of Europe. 

Gideon Rachman
And what about the role of national rivalries? Because name almost any sphere of European co-operation, that’s always a big issue. Can you get countries on the same page? And we’re talking at a time of this security crisis in Europe, but also everybody says Franco-German relations are really bad. Macron doesn’t get on with Scholz. How much is that continuing to be a bit of a problem? 

Bastian Giegerich
Well, I think in general, big strategic terms it’s a problem. And then it’s a specific problem also in defence. And in the big picture, I think it’s part of the tragedy that major European leaders right now are weak domestically. Prime Minister Sunak in the UK is looking at a very challenging rest of the year, to put it mildly. Olaf Scholz in Germany is seeing his party’s poll numbers in a fairly unhappy place and his three-way coalition in almost perpetual infighting. And he will look at elections in 2025. And in France, Macron’s domestic agenda is stuck as well. And I think if we look at the last couple of weeks, it’s actually quite interesting what Macron has done. His position has obviously evolved quite a bit over the last couple of months with regards to Ukraine, and I think he has done something that was long overdue, namely to remind Nato leaders that in strategy and in deterrence, strategic ambiguity can be a virtue.

I think it was an unforced error committed by US President Biden, by the Nato secretary-general and most other Nato leaders very early on, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, to say that Nato does not want direct confrontation with Russia and that Nato will not be a party to this war. The effect of that has been that Nato has self-deterred. And instead of creating a fear of escalation in Vladimir Putin’s head and keep him guessing what the alliance might do, when it might choose to do it, what the trigger might be, we managed to create fear of escalation in our own heads. And the side effect of that is that every time new measures to support Ukraine are being discussed — be that main battle tanks, western fighter jets, longer-range weapon systems — Nato nations have to reassure themselves that this is not escalatory. I need to rebuild the political consensus to act. This is time-consuming. That creates divisions. Those divisions can be exploited. Those divisions can turn ugly and nasty, as some of the back and forth between France and Germany has over the last couple of weeks.

And maybe now that Macron has changed his tune quite a bit, maybe that’s an opportunity to revisit some of those divisions and some of those debates. 

Gideon Rachman
Yeah. Although what was striking to me is how isolated Macron was in saying that. It’s not like any other European leader said, yes, we could actually send troops to find in Ukraine. On the contrary, a lot of them seemed to be backing off that. 

Bastian Giegerich
Well, I think you need to start somewhere. And I think if one takes into account how far back one had to reach to change that narrative, that there are things that cannot be discussed, I think in that context, Macron saying, well, you know, why would I take options off the table? That should be part of my toolbox. I think that’s an important step in itself. So I don’t think there was universal rejection of his ideas. There was a food-for-thought paper circulated by France that generated a number of responses. I wouldn’t say all of them were outright negative. So I think a marker has been introduced in the debate that wasn’t there before, and we will see where it leads to. But I think at the minimum, it should make people think about the benefits that can sometimes be drawn from introducing a bit of strategic ambiguity into your own posture to make the risk calculations for your opponent a bit harder. 

Gideon Rachman
I mean, so Macron’s played a leading role on this, but in other respects he sometimes drags his feet. I mean, for example, as I understand it, the French were a bit reluctant to use European money to buy ammunition, buy weaponry from outside Europe. Has that changed? And should it change? 

Bastian Giegerich
I think it has changed a bit, but I think that goes back to your earlier point about the rivalries and the differences of views. There are those in Europe who primarily look at the situation and see a time challenge. So one needs to move with great urgency. And therefore in that mindset, it doesn’t matter much where you get your artillery shells for example. Whether that’s Europe or outside of Europe is secondary. And then there are those who say, well, look, at this time that Europe is starting to rebuild its own military capacity, the strategic choice has to be that at the same time it invests in its own defence industrial capabilities, so that it does, over time, achieve a greater degree of autonomy and the ability to do things for itself rather than create new dependencies on the defence industrial side.

That’s a legitimate argument to have, but I think the pendulum is swinging in the direction of those who are saying, well, this is a matter of urgency. Of course, there’s another question then regarding where European nations procure for themselves as they go about replenishing their own stocks. And I think that is, in the long run, the argument that the French and some others have made. There needs to be a significant role for European industry as those European tax euros and pounds and whatever else are being spent. 

Gideon Rachman
So let’s conclude then with that question that you raise of timeframe. I don’t particularly want to be alarmist, but you could see, I think by the end of the year, things looking really quite grim in Europe. I mean, if Russia does make the kinds of advances we were discussing earlier, and Donald Trump is elected and follows through on some of his . . . he’s a bit all over the place on Nato, but some of his more negative comments on that. And you see an effort to force the Ukrainians to conclude a disadvantageous peace and him undermining Nato. Do you think Europe could be having a much more intense sense of security crisis by the end of the year? 

Bastian Giegerich
Yeah, I mean, Gideon, I don’t know what will happen on the 5th of November in the US, but I think, I mean, first of all, I would say it is interesting that US aid to Ukraine has now been blocked in the US for months, and the president is actually called Biden. So Trump already has a stranglehold on the US system to a degree, and we don’t need to wait to ponder what this might mean and feel a certain degree of alarm. And then, you know what? A re-elected president Trump who runs Nato like a protection racket and a Russian President Putin looking at 2025 with anticipation because he had battlefield success in 2024 — would that be a fairly scary outlook to many Europeans? I would say for sure. Is Europe prepared for this scenario? I mean, given what we’ve just discussed, I would say definitely not. So I think this needs to be a wake-up call for Europe, really. If not this, then I’m not sure I’m imaginative enough to think of what else it could be. 

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Gideon Rachman
That was Bastian Giegerich, recently appointed as the new director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, ending this edition of the Rachman Review. Thanks for listening. Please join us again next week. 

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