Can Turkey help end the Ukraine grain crisis?

This is an audio transcript of the Rachman Review podcast episode: Can Turkey help end the Ukraine grain crisis?

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Andrew England
Hello and welcome to the Rachman Review. I’m Andrew England, Middle East editor, standing in for Gideon Rachman. In this week’s edition, we take a look at Turkey’s efforts to act as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, including Ankara’s push to negotiate a deal that allows for the safe passage of Ukrainian grain from the Black Sea. We also discuss what it means for Turkish domestic politics ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for next June. My guest today, Asli Aydıntaşbaş, senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, who is based in Istanbul, and Laura Pitel, the FT’s Turkey correspondent who’s made Ankara her home for the past seven years. So why is President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan playing a mediator role in the Ukraine war?

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This week, Erdoğan was in Tehran where he held talks with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and Iranian leaders. As well as the Syrian conflict, where all three are important actors, the two presidents discussed efforts to get the Ukrainian green deal over the line.

News clip
Putin thanked Turkey’s president for his help in negotiating a deal to end the Black Sea blockade. Russia’s invasion has stranded millions of tons of grain. Officials expect that there will be an agreement announced later this week that could allow the Black Sea ports to reopen.

Andrew England
In many ways, Turkey is in a unique position as it is the only Nato remember that still enjoys cordial relations with Moscow, in no small part because of the bond that has developed between Erdoğan and Putin, two strongmen who have been able to put aside their differences to forge a pragmatic relationship. Ankara’s diplomacy has enabled Erdoğan to burnish his image as an international player to supporters at home, while also soothing his often testy relations with the US and European nations. But at home, Erdoğan faces arguably his toughest challenge: to maintain his and his ruling AK Party’s grip on power. The president’s popularity is dwindling as he presides over an increasingly troubled economy, with inflation soaring to almost 80 per cent.

News clip
A well-known independent research group announced that Turkey’s annual inflation, in fact, rose to more than 175 per cent in June. That’s more than double the official rate. Now, all these doubts are adding to people’s frustration and despair in this massive currency and cost of living crisis.

Andrew England
Another key election issue will be the growing hostility in Turkey to the 3.7mn Syrian refugees in the country. In recent weeks, Erdoğan has been threatening to launch another military offensive across the border in northern Syria, in part to push back against Kurdish militants, whom Ankara considers terrorists, but also to expand so-called safe zones in the hope that more refugees will return. When Turks do go to the ballot box, Erdoğan will face an opposition united like never before. So will Turkey’s international mediation efforts in the Ukraine conflict help boost Erdoğan’s standing at home? I began our discussion by asking Asli what Erdoğan’s chief motivation is in his efforts this week to negotiate a safe passage for Ukraine’s grain exports.

Asli Aydıntaşbaş
Well, Turkey’s very aware that this Ukraine war has increased its influence on the global stage. Turkey is engaged in this balancing act. Very proud of it that they have an open line of communication with Kremlin, but they’ve become an indispensable partner for Ukraine and as such, have some level of appreciation from the west. And I think they understand that this is a chance to reverse Turkey’s terrible state of relations with transatlantic partners and also polish its global brand as the sort of country that can play a balancing role, a critical player. And Erdoğan’s aim has always been Turkey in the great power competition, and I think this is a perfect opportunity.

Andrew England
How do we explain this relationship he has with Putin? I mean, it’s incredibly complex. If we look at Syria, Turkey and Russia are on the opposing sides. In 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet. If you look at Libya, Russia and Turkey have been on the opposing sides. So how do you explain this relationship? What brings them together?

Asli Aydıntaşbaş
People have called it competitive co-operation. And it’s very unusual because Turkey and Russia are frenemy. They are competing, supporting opposite sides in conflicts in Libya and Syria, yet somehow have managed to work together to carve out separate zones of influence in these conflicts. And what is unique is that generally in rules-based western liberal order, we’re used to allies or enemies, not used to this kind of non-binary relationship where you work together on some issues and fight in others or compete in others or work around each other on other issues. And that’s exactly what Turkey and Russia does. And the kind of relationship between Erdoğan and Putin is what nails it. A handshake between these two extremely macho, patriarchal and authoritarian characters is the foundation of this interesting arrangement.

Andrew England
OK. And Laura, at the same time, Erdoğan’s trying to manage his relationship with Ukraine. And how challenging and difficult has that been? I mean, on the one hand, you know, Turkey has sold drones to Ukraine, which have been very important. But on the other hand, he does seem to have this, you know, friendship with Putin. How does he balance the two?

Laura Pitel
Yeah, the relationship between Ankara and Kyiv is also a very complicated one. And at times you hear very fulsome praise from the Ukrainians, from President Zelenskyy towards Turkey, and at times you hear frustration. So as you say, Andrew, Turkey has sold Bayraktar drones, made by none other than Erdoğan’s son-in-law, to the Ukrainian armed forces. And they’ve become this kind of symbol in a way of the Ukrainian resistance military, even singing songs about them. But on the other hand, Ukraine is very frustrated about the fact that a lot of grain that Ukraine says has been looted from its farmers has been coming through Turkey, being sold to some Turkish companies, and the Turks have been quite resistant to doing anything about it. So there’s complexities, tensions, but also areas of co-operation in that relationship too.

Andrew England
Another concern is whether Turkey becomes an arena for sanctioned Russians to go or for Russian dirty money to go. I mean, I think when western diplomats talk about the areas of their concern, they talk about Turkey and Dubai. You mentioned the grain, the shipments of grain. Are there other signs that Turkey is also becoming something of a conduit for Russian business, Russian money?

Laura Pitel
Well, the most blatant, rather large sign of the Russian money coming to Turkey was when a load of Russian oligarchs’ superyachts turned up on the Turkish coast a few months ago. Several of them have found a safe haven in Turkish ports because Turkey hasn’t signed up to western sanctions on Russia. So there was a feeling, I think, among Russian oligarchs that Turkish ports were safe for their boats. And western officials are concerned that that is a sort of tip of the iceberg, that Turkey could end up becoming a home for Russian money. It’s not clear yet the extent to which that is a valid concern. Definitely, quite a lot of Russians have come here in the aftermath of conflict. But whether or not they’re oligarchs or whether they’re sort of middle-class Russians fleeing Putin sort of remains to be seen. But we do know that western governments are worried about it. The US deputy treasury secretary came here a few weeks ago and held meetings both with Turkish officials and also with Turkish banks in Istanbul to warn them: “Don’t become a haven for Russian money.”

Andrew England
And Asli, I guess one thing we shouldn’t forget in all of this is the economic linkages even before the crisis between Turkey and Russia. I mean, Turkey’s heavily dependent on Russian gas, Russian tourism. There was a period when Russia put sanctions on Turkey after Turkey shot down the fighter jet over Syria and that had a big impact. So how important are those economic linkages and how much do they play into how Erdoğan interacts with Putin and Russia and the Ukraine crisis?

Asli Aydıntaşbaş
Hugely important. Over the past decade, Turkey has become a whole lot more dependent on Russia economically and in some ways strategically as well. Don’t forget, Russians control Turkey’s southern flank, that is to say, Syria. Also, Russian tourists are very important for the Turkish economy, especially now when the economy is going south. Russia has built a pipeline under Black Sea directly to Turkey: TurkStream. It’s a critical project. And they’re building Turkey’s first nuclear reactor. All of these things actually are creating a whole lot of interdependency; more and more dependency, perhaps, because obviously Turkey is more dependent on Russia. When Russians put sanctions on Turkey, economic sanctions on Turkey, you basically had Turkish officials begging Moscow to lift sanctions on tomatoes, even. Even that matters to Turkish farmers. So the relationship is definitely one that favours Russia in economic terms, and it’s far beyond natural gas. It is also that there’s an S-400 missile system present in Turkey that is a huge deal in terms of Turkey’s defence architecture, but also these critical infrastructure projects are not going away. So I think Erdoğan, when he deals with Ukraine, there are always limits in terms of how far he can go in his partnership with Ukraine. There’s sort of unwritten rules of conduct in terms of how far he can go in Syria. Turkish incursions in Syria have never taken place without a green light from Russia. So I think this relationship is unique and that Russia does seem to have a huge amount of leverage over Turkey.

Andrew England
Well, that’s very interesting. And of course, you mentioned the S-400 and the S-400 was a source of tensions between Turkey and the US and other Nato allies. And so it doesn’t matter to Erdoğan whether he has good relations with the US and Europe? Does he care about it? Does he want to improve relations with the west?

Asli Aydıntaşbaş
Domestically, the image Erdoğan wants to cultivate is a global leader, a man who can play hardball with the likes of Joe Biden, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin. This is very important for his constituency, and it’s also one of the core messages in his electoral campaign. So I think he does want to improve relations with the west also for economic reasons. The Turkish economy is so well integrated into the global markets that tensions with the west do harm Turkish markets, does hurt the Turkish lira. So, yes, he does have to have better relations with the west. It doesn’t have to be perfect harmony. He doesn’t have to be something like the ‘90s, where Turkey was a very loyal Nato member, but he does have to have better relations with the west that are free of conflict.

Andrew England
At the beginning you were talking about how Erdoğan saw this as a moment to kind of show Turkey’s standing on the global stage. Do you think he succeeded in doing that through his diplomatic efforts? Because you’ve got that on the one hand. And of course, on the other hand, you’ve had Turkish opposition to Finland and Sweden joining Nato. And now that goes back to the Kurdish question, the Kurdish problem and the northern Syria problem. But I think just in this context, how much credibility or goodwill has Turkey gained and perhaps how much has it squandered?

Asli Aydıntaşbaş
I think Erdoğan’s motto is: it is better to be feared than liked. But I think Erdoğan is quite clear on where he wants to go, and that’s more the pursuit of strategic autonomy. He doesn’t want to be a Russian vessel, doesn’t want to become a Eurasian power, but he doesn’t want to be a loyal card-carrying member of Nato either. He wants to have a foot in each camp and be able to play off Russia against the west and vice versa. I think S-400s have ended up serving that purpose, but it also cost Turkey a lot. Turkey was effectively kicked out of the F-35 fighter jet programme, and that means not only not being able to purchase F-35 jets, as Greece and other countries in the region are buying them, but also being kicked out of the production chain because Turkey was producing parts of this joint project, and that’s a loss of about 11bn. So now Turkey cannot activate S-400s that it has bought from Russia because of huge opposition from the United States and other Nato countries. So it’s time to purchase an alternative system, whether it’s going to be Patriots or a French Italian missile defence system. At the end of the day, Turkey has paid two and a half-billion dollars for S-400s from Russia but cannot use them. So, pluses and minuses. On a strategic level, Erdoğan managed to get Turkey to have some type of an immunity from harsher sanctions, but on the other hand, it is no longer seen as a reliable partner — so, a mixed bag.

Andrew England
Do you think ultimately he will support Finland and Sweden joining Nato?

Asli Aydıntaşbaş
I think we’re going to have another round of drama. There will be suspense. And is Erdoğan going to veto it? What happens? Is it going to pass the Turkish parliament? But at the end of the day, Turkey will because it has to, because all other Nato allies want this to go forward. But Erdoğan will try to extract more from Sweden and Finland and we haven’t seen the last of this issue, I think.

Andrew England
Turkey is obviously worried about the activities of what they view to be Kurdish militants in Sweden and Finland and the whole question of the YPG and the PKK is seen as a genuine security threat in Turkey, not just by Erdoğan but by most mainstream politicians.

Asli Aydıntaşbaş
You have a sizeable portion of the population that now consider US a top national security threat. And that’s because of US support for Syrian Kurdish groups. So, it is seen across the political spectrum as a security issue. But Erdoğan will manage this and play this, I think, also to boost his domestic popularity in the run-up to Turkish elections.

Andrew England
It’s a good opportunity to move on to the domestic situation. I mean, Laura, obviously you’re preparing for Turkey going to parliamentary and presidential elections, which have to be held by June next year. And the question — does Erdoğan extend his hold on power, on his AK party, which has been in power for about two decades — can he extend that grip? Does the global diplomacy, does that help him? Because obviously he’s grappling with a pretty tough economic situation at home. His popularity is down. Does this boost him? Does he see this as good for his domestic audience?

Laura Pitel
I think he hopes that it is good for his domestic audience. I mean, Erdoğan’s own image that he has tried to create for himself is one of being a strong leader, a powerful figure on the world stage. But there’s not a huge amount of evidence that this kind of thing, this rally, for example, with Sweden and Finland, is really helping him. You know, what everybody is talking about here in Turkey is the economy and also refugees, which has become a massive political issue. Turkey has about 3.7mn Syrian refugees, several hundred thousand Afghans. And I think growing discontent over their presence has combined with the economic misery to make people very unhappy. And, although Erdoğan might win the approval of voters for his stance on, for example, Sweden and Finland — I think the majority of the public do support the stance he’s taken on that — it’s not clear to me that that is going to translate into winning more votes for him. The polls don’t look very good for him. You know, the combined support for the AK Party and its allies is at a rock bottom. The opposition look like they can win parliament. I mean, the caveat to all of this is what conditions the elections are gonna take place under. You know, a lot of foreign diplomats who I talked to here in Ankara and also people in the opposition privately will say that they are concerned about the conditions the elections will take place under. Will they be free? Will they be fair? What kind of tactics will Erdoğan use to try and make the playing field tilt in his favour? But it’s looking extremely difficult for him. I’ve been in Turkey seven years now and I’ve seen a lot of elections where people have said this is really going to be the most difficult for Erdoğan, this is going to be his last one. So there is some scepticism, particularly internationally, about whether or not the opposition really could beat Erdoğan. But it definitely looks like it’s going to be a tough contest for him.

Andrew England
How bad does it feel economically? Do you see protest? Do you see disgruntlement? I mean, prices must be soaring. Savings are getting wiped out. How is that materialising on the ground and how do you see it in everyday life?

Laura Pitel
Yeah, it’s affecting everybody’s life, I would say. Obviously, the people who are hardest hit are those at the bottom. And, you know, research by Turkish trade unions suggests that the minimum wage is not enough for people to fend off poverty and hunger right now. Inflation’s actually almost at 80 per cent year on year now. Food prices have been rising even more than that. And these are the official numbers which are heavily disputed by the opposition and by some independent analysts who accuse the government of massaging the figures. So people are really struggling. You know, you hear even middle-class families saying things like, you know, meat has become a luxury. Poor families say that even vegetables and fruits are too expensive for them to buy now. I’ve met many people who say that they’re surviving on, you know, pulses, grains, pasta, really cutting back on their spending. And then when you move up the social spectrum, you know, middle-class families can only dream of going on holiday abroad because the lira has weakened so much over the last five years. I mean, year-on-year alone, it’s down 50 per cent against the dollar. So going to Europe right now is just not possible. Everybody’s lives have been affected by this.

Andrew England
Quite a lot of the blame for this, certainly from Erdoğan’s critics, would be on his pursuit of unorthodox monetary policy. While much of the rest of the world is putting up interest rates to tackle inflation, Erdoğan insists that interest rates should be kept low and has gone through a string of central bank governors to ensure that his views on monetary policy are followed. Can you try to explain why does he believe this?

Laura Pitel
Yeah, I mean, it’s a good question. And it’s one that’s hard to get to the bottom of. I remember asking Erdoğan about this at a rare press conference he gave with a group of foreign journalists a few years ago. And I said, you know, economists say that the way to tackle inflation is to raise interest rates. And he said, I am an economist, because, you know, he insists that he had some economic training in his youth. He seems to have this life-long devotion to the idea that low interest rates combat inflation rather than the opposite way round, which is what economic established orthodoxy argues. And he recently, last year, he sort of repackaged this whole belief into an argument about how he was pursuing a new economic model. He says that by cutting interest rates and weakening the currency, he’s going to make Turkish exports more competitive, rebalance the current account deficit, which has long been a source of pressure on the lira, which translates into inflation. He thinks that he can defy the laws of economic gravity. But everybody else in the world and in Turkey thinks this is madness. I mean, I’ve heard some economists describe this as a great economic experiment. One person said to me, economics is a difficult science because we’re not usually able to test out our theories and prove them because it would lead to misery for millions of people. But here in Turkey, Erdoğan’s doing it for us. Really, he’s pursuing a very lonely path on this. And because of the way that Erdoğan has shorn himself of alternate voices over the years, there’s really not anybody in government who’s challenging him. He’s got a bunch of yes men around him in the kind of economic ministry, in the central bank. And it seems quite likely that he’s not going to budge until, really, they’re up against the wall. So Turkey is on this path. He’s committed to it and Turkish people are paying the price.

Andrew England
Asli, if you look at the opposition today, they form this kind of unprecedented alliance. You’ve got six opposition parties that have come together. But I was recently there on a reporting trip with Laura, and one thing that seemed to keep coming back was, will they choose the right candidate to take on Erdoğan?

Asli Aydıntaşbaş
Yes, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is the frontrunner now. His name is in the mix in terms of who would run against Erdoğan. And he’s the least popular of the several names that are out there. But nonetheless, it is looking like he will be running. He is 73 but has not won an election against Erdoğan. And it’s also the case that, it’s a bit of a touchy subject, but he comes from an Alevi background, a minority background, and that could be used against him because this is a country in which you have had a history of sectarian conflict and tensions. So, the problem is for the opposition. They think that right now Erdoğan’s numbers are so bad that anybody could win against him. But that may not be the case because we don’t know what type of a political climate we’re going to have six months, eight months, a year from now, when we go to elections. There could be cross-border incursions in Syria. There could be a more repressive environment. There could be all types of things and questions about free and fair elections. So I say no, because the opposition is taking a risk. Looking at the numbers from today, today, Kılıçdaroğlu, it looks like he can win against Erdoğan — but we may not have the same political climate when we go to the polls.

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Andrew England
That was Turkey expert Asli Aydıntaşbaş ending this edition of the Rachman Review. Next week, my colleague Madhumita Murgia will be talking to international lawyer and campaigner Cori Crider about how to rein in some of the poisonous rhetoric on social media. So please do join us then.

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