Scotland’s independence battle is a long way from the Balkans

Coined after the bloody disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, “Balkanisation” is a word with nasty connotations of state collapse and ethnic conflict. So it is striking that it is the word two heavyweights of international relations have used recently to describe the possible consequences if Scotland votes for independence on September 18.

Speaking to the Financial Times, Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign minister, warned that a referendum victory for Scotland’s nationalists could cause the “Balkanisation of the British Isles”. The comments from Mr Bildt have particular resonance given his experience, as the UN’s special envoy to the Balkans between 1999 and 2001, of the suffering inflicted by the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia.

And in April, George Robertson, the Scots’ former secretary-general of the Nato alliance, saw even broader dire results, saying that Scottish independence would be “cataclysmic in geopolitical terms” and could lead to “Balkanisation” across Europe.

Scottish independence would certainly have far reaching implications. It would surely encourage self-determination movements across Europe and beyond. It would hive off a sizeable chunk of a leading EU economy and potentially put into question the UK’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council and its ability to continue as a nuclear weapons power.

Yet comparisons with historic state break-ups need to be treated with care, not least because the UK, in terms of its current constitutional debate, is a long way from the Balkans.

UK leaders have long made clear they have no wish to force Scotland against its will to remain in the political union sealed with England in 1707. David Cameron, UK prime minister, says that refusing to approve September’s referendum would have been a recipe for conflict between Edinburgh and London. Giving Scotland a choice was, Mr Cameron says, quite simply “the right thing to do”.

The result is an independence debate of surprising moderation. Scottish nationalists cannot seriously claim to be engaged in a liberation struggle. Most campaigning on both sides centre on what leaving the UK would mean for the general economy and individual prosperity.

The UK government’s main contribution has been a long series of analysis papers arguing that Scotland will be safer, more fiscally secure and more prosperous within the union. Where other nations might send in the troops to suppress separatists, modern Britain deploys bureaucrats to bombard them with statistics.

This does not mean the debate is always a model of enlightened civic discourse. Politicians on each side spend much of their time mischaracterising their opponent’s positions or furiously spinning facts in their own favour.

In depth

Future of the union

Scotland will decide in a referendum to be held on September 18 2014 whether or not to end the 307-year-old union with England

And a statistical showdown last week left many voters shaking their heads as Scottish leaders promised an “independence bonus” worth £1,000 per person a year by 2029-30, while UK counterparts insisted staying in the union meant an immediate annual “UK dividend” worth £1,400.

Scottish entrepreneur Sir Tom Hunter denounced the financial claims as “farcical” and of no use to people like him who remain undecided. “We as voters have been disrespected,” he complained.

Yet the political focus on pragmatic issues leaves little opportunity for the expression of baser instincts. Even the dourest prognosticators do not suggest that a Yes vote in September would lead to internecine conflict or ethnic cleansing.

Opinion polls suggest the most likely result on September 18 is for Scotland to remain firmly in the UK. Even if the nationalists win, the impact outside Scotland would be tempered by a Scottish Nationalist Party vision for independence that in many ways favours the international status quo.

The party wants Scotland to remain deeply economically integrated with the remaining UK – even hoping to share monetary policy and a currency – to continue as part of the EU and Nato.

That, combined with an impeccably democratic process and a formal commitment by both sides to co-operate after the referendum whatever voters decide, suggest Scottish independence could be an inspiration not for Yugoslav-style Balkanisation, but for the peaceful resolution of questions of constitutional identity.

Scottish pro-independence commentators cite the 1993 “velvet divorce” of the Czech and Slovak republics as an example of how national division need not be violent.

Another example closer to Mr Bildt’s home is the 1905 Norwegian plebiscite that led to the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden. That vote is credited with helping to avert conflict rather than fostering it, and separation hardly proved a barrier to long-term shared prosperity. If Scandinavia can be seen as an example of Balkanisation, the word suddenly sounds a lot less scary.