WASHINGTON, DC - SEPTEMBER 10: U.S. President Barack Obama delivers a prime time address from the Cross Hall of the White House on September 10, 2014 in Washington, DC.  Vowing to target the Islamic State with air strikes "wherever they exist", Obama pledged to lead a broad coalition to fight IS and work with "partner forces" on the ground in Syria and Iraq.  (Photo by Saul Loeb-Pool/Getty Images)
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The US invaded Iraq in 2003 with misplaced certainty, misconstrued assumptions and poor foresight. The same is true of its armed intervention against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (known as Isis).

President Barack Obama’s Middle East policy is adrift amid the region’s shifting currents. Indeed, since the Arab uprisings began, the White House has misdiagnosed each crisis, intervened with little heed to the consequences and overestimated its ability to shape the outcomes in its favour.

Last month’s US air strikes in Iraq were defined and defensive. That posture has evolved into one that is open-ended and offensive, as seen in this month’s extension of air power into Syria in the quest to “degrade” Isis.

Yet Isis is not the fundamental cause of the problems in Iraq and Syria; it is a deadly symptom of a toxic environment. Mr Obama is following the flawed logic behind the failed “war on terror”, focusing on body counts rather than the conditions that give rise to radicalisation. After more than a decade, western military intervention has generated more threats than it has defeated.

In addition, while the physical Iraq-Syria border may be erased, integrating the two theatres ignores the fact of the political border. The risks of involvement in Syria are greater than in Iraq, and more prone to escalation and entanglement. That is because US intervention overlooks the fact that the civil wars in Iraq and Syria derive not from militancy but from power struggles driven by the parochial interests of indigenous factions and external powers.

Intervention is likely to deflate interest within Iraq in compromise, and in­flate opportunism on all sides in the Syrian conflict. Indeed, a western commitment to take responsibility for fighting Isis reduces the need for local and regional parties to make concessions to unite against this common enemy.

Furthermore, the involvement of a superpower could intensify regional competition, perpetuating Sunni hubris and Shia fears, and increasing the prospect of war among states in the Middle East. Indeed, the US cannot target militants in Syria and also assume it is not an active participant in a regional and sectarian contest over the balance of power.

On one hand, current US policy perpetuates the Sunni Arab perception of an axis between Washington, the Shia and Shia-aligned regimes in Tehran, Baghdad and Damascus. It also could raise fears among Shia that confronting Isis is a prelude to regime change in Syria. On the other, it may weaken the incentive of Iraq’s factions to compromise, and could intensify competition among regional rivals in Syria.

Moreover, the “moderate” rebels favoured by the west are a small fraction of the Syrian opposition. Unlike the more radical and foreign elements their size is finite, and likely to fall as the civil war continues. Some argue for arming them to “level the playing field”, forcing the regime to the negotiating table. But this overlooks the fact that the civil war is a multidimensional power struggle among local, regional and international actors. Whichever side is given arms, increased intensity is to be expected, not equilibrium, and certainly not resolution.

History shows channelling weapons and capital into insurgencies can make bad situations worse. The constant fragmentation and consolidation within both insurgencies makes it unlikely that western resources would remain in favoured hands. There is also a risk that favoured hands, whether Iraqi Kurds or western-backed insurgents in Syria, would use those resources for aims other than pushing back Isis.

As he steps up his rhetoric and deepens US involvement, Mr Obama must understand that defeating Isis will not remove the logic behind the conflicts in Iraq and Syria – but risks adding more fuel to the conflagration.

The writer is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East

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