Americans are coming to grips with the cost of war. A week ago the Bush administration released a fiscal blueprint that signalled its intent to ask Congress for $120bn in two separate “supplemental appropriations” to fund operations in Iraq and Afghanistan – this on the heels of $323bn in such one-time appropriations since 2001. Simultaneously, George W. Bush unveiled his fiscal 2007 budget, which featured a nearly 7 per cent rise in base defence spending, just over 3 per cent increases in homeland security areas and net cuts elsewhere in the annual funding cycle. In short, the paired requests highlighted the cost of defence funding by squeezing transportation, environmental protection, low-income programmes and the myriad other things Americans equate with government.

With a bit less fanfare, the administration also unveiled the results of the third Quadrennial Defence Review – a congressionally mandated top-to-bottom review of US defence strategy, as well as the troops, tactics and equipment to execute it. A centrepiece finding is the need to prepare the military to fight a “long war” against terrorism – or, put differently, to be ready to undertake Iraq-style actions as a regular diet. Accordingly, the distinction between base and supplemental funding is rapidly disappearing.