Principles are fine things, but they are a lousy guide to what banks might do next. Santander, reporting two weeks ago, did not see any economic imperative to raise more capital. Third quarter earnings were solid, its balance sheet relatively strong and its funding as reliable as ever, with 75 per cent of its needs met from deposits. How irritating, then, to see these perceived advantages over historically riskier banks eroded by rival recapitalisations that have left Santander’s normally respectable capital ratio looking thin – at a roughly 6 per cent core tier one – compared with northern European banks.

Santander could have strengthened its capital ratios gradually, through retained earnings, the eventual sale of assets and holding the dividend, which costs it about €4bn a year. With the gradual ungumming of money markets, Santander could also have argued that it had time on its side. That it chose to do a U-turn instead, raising €7.2bn in a deeply discounted rights issue, is another sign of bankers’ newfound risk aversion. There is simply no upside in being an outlier even if Santander could have defended a capital ratio that has been only minimally reduced by recent deals.