A bidding war normally implies a desirable target. Yet Delta and American Airlines, the two largest carriers by fleet size, are vying for the chance to pour money into Japan Airlines, the world’s worst major operator by almost any metric you care to mention. JAL’s gross margins are about half the global peer group average; none can compete with a six-year average return on equity of minus 17 per cent. Net debt to equity was 346 per cent at the end of March, comfortably the worst in class. Management, contemplating the latest in a series of cuts to staff, hubs and wages on Tuesday, expects another net loss this year.

But however feeble the near-term returns, and however strong their competing calls on capital, this is an opportunity neither Delta nor American dares to pass up. Injecting $300m or so would keep JAL’s borrowing lines open. An American rescuer could then exploit the imminent liberalisation of Japan’s aviation sector: after years of to-ing and fro-ing, the US and Japan are nearing an agreement on an “open-skies” policy, allowing trans-Pacific carriers to co-ordinate more tightly on prices and schedules. American and JAL, both members of the Oneworld alliance, seem natural partners. But if Delta, already a top-four operator on US-Japan routes, could tempt JAL to defect to SkyTeam, American might find itself out in the cold. Japan’s number two, ANA, belongs to the third big network, Star Alliance.