There are three key elements to a nuclear weapon - the fissile material, the missile itself and the process of weaponising the fissile material for the missile. The US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear programme published this week suggests that Iran has put work on the last of these elements on hold. If so, good. But Iran is still pursuing the other two elements, in particular an enrichment programme that has no apparent civilian application, but which could produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon, despite demands to stop from the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Iran's leaders portray this as a conflict with the international community who wish to deny Iran's people their rights. This is wrong. We are not trying to stop Iran enjoying the benefits of nuclear power - we have offered assistance to develop their civil nuclear power industry. Iran's pursuit of proliferation-sensitive activities, particularly its enrichment programme, is what concerns us. It has no need of it. Russia has guaranteed fuel for Bushehr, Iran's only planned nuclear power plant, and the EU3 plus three (UK, France, Germany, US, Russia, China) have guaranteed future supplies of nuclear fuel.