The Mons Myth

The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle
By Terence Zuber
The History Press £20, 304 pages
FT Bookshop price: £16

Soldiers are acutely aware of their military predecessors and want to match or surpass their exploits. When British infantrymen marched into northern France and Belgium at the beginning of the first world war, they passed near the battlefields of Agincourt, Crécy, Malplaquet and Waterloo. The image of the sturdy foot soldier standing up to the might of a continental foe was very much in their minds and, at the battle of Mons on August 23 1914, it appeared that rifle-armed infantry – like earlier bow-wielding yeomanry – had taken on the greater numbers of their enemy and given them a damn good thrashing.

Although not technically a victory (the British withdrew from the battlefield) they had inflicted enough damage on the Germans for Mons to join the ranks of British military successes. This has been the received opinion in this country for 96 years. The Mons Myth by Terence Zuber demolishes this cherished view of triumph against the odds.

The official British history of the Great War portrayed Mons as a combat in which the rapid-fire of British riflemen devastated the advancing Germans – so much so that it was claimed the Germans thought they were under fire from machine-guns.

Zuber, who has studied archives in Germany and military manuals of the period, says this is a ludicrous claim with very little evidence to back it up. German tactics consisted of movement in which infantry attacked in open formations and sought cover as protection against rifles. German records of Mons do not mention machine-gun-like fire, or particularly heavy losses. Both sides were roughly equal in numbers. So why did the British get it so wrong?

Obviously, there was a need for a morale-boosting performance by the British Expeditionary Force at the beginning of the war, and success at Mons suited that very well. But there also appears to have been a more practical explanation. When British riflemen saw German figures fall before them, they presumed they were dead. In fact, they were simply seeking cover.

Curiously, one German veteran of the battle also played his part in creating the myth of Mons. Walter Bloem was a novelist and playwright who later wrote his own version of the combat in which his unit – the 12th Grenadiers – was nearly destroyed by British rifle-fire. His account pleased British military historians at the time, who had it translated and quoted widely from it. As Zuber reveals, Bloem’s account was over-dramatised: the experience of the 12th Grenadiers was different to other regiments, who suffered far fewer casualties.

Sometimes Zuber’s writing is too trusting in the efficiency of the Germans to follow their manuals, and one would have liked more first-hand accounts of German veterans. But, as a corrective to one of the great British military legends, Zuber’s detective work is brilliantly thorough and provides thought-provoking new evidence.

Tim Newark is the author of ‘Highlander: the History of the Legendary Highland Soldier’ (Constable)