The modest agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme with the US and its international partners is a rare, if provisional, piece of good news. The partial and tentative deal struck at talks in Geneva on Thursday sets up a roadblock on what was beginning to look like an inexorable path to confrontation with the Islamic Republic. It could even open up a broader avenue of engagement, by addressing the security concerns of Iran, its neighbours, and the west.
The recent disclosure of another undeclared nuclear site near Qom ratcheted up the tension. But it has also forced the antagonists to focus more intensely on Iran’s nuclear ambitions – on the endgame, on how to get there, and on the stark alternative of conflict.
From Tehran’s point of view, the salient feature of Geneva was Iran’s first sustained, high-level contact with the US since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The talks were with the so-called P5+1 – the US, Russia, China, the UK and France (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council) plus Germany. But the qualitative leap was enabled by the close co-operation between Washington and Moscow. The Iranians heard one voice.
Under the deal, Iran will ship abroad the bulk of its known stock of low-enriched uranium for reprocessing into higher grade medical isotopes for cancer treatment. Russia will enrich the uranium to greater purity, then send it to France to be packaged up for use by an Iranian research reactor in Tehran. Iran will meanwhile allow external inspection of its new plant. If all goes to plan.
Hillary Clinton, US secretary of state, is right to strike a note of caution, saying that the “meeting opened the door”. But that door has been closed for 30 years, and was sealed up during the eight years of the Bush administration.
President Barack Obama, by contrast, by deciding to engage, has got more out of Iran in eight hours than his predecessor’s muscular posturing did in eight years. Of course, that will not end the controversy – or the potential threat.
Iran will say, correctly, it has not given up its right to enrich uranium; its adversaries will say, correctly, it is buying time. Yet, to the extent that the risk of an Iranian “break-out” into weaponisation has been eliminated in the short term (and perhaps longer), we have all bought time. That must now be used intelligently.
Iran, first of all, has to deliver. Only transparency can build confidence. The talks need then to combine the nuclear dossier with ways of alleviating Tehran’s legitimate security concerns, and the equally valid worries of its neighbours.
The best way to confront Iran is with a deal: eventually allowing it to enrich uranium under strict monitoring, once it starts demonstrating its wish to contribute to the stability of its region.
