In a capitalist economy, losers are expected to take losses and winners to gain. Private enterprise is best able to allocate capital efficiently and, where it fails to do so, markets make adjustments and capital is reallocated to efficient users. This basic tenet supports good and productive assets moving from the hands of weak players to stronger. Where this is not possible, the US system gives the government a hand in fostering that move through an efficient process called bankruptcy or reorganisation. This rule of markets and of law has always been the basis of our national supremacy in innovation and the reason ours was the world’s clear choice of a reserve currency. That was the world we lived in previously.

Our elected officials have repeatedly demonstrated that even equity holders, who are supposed to have the most subordinated claims on assets, cannot be allowed to take losses and instead believe we should all communally share in losses that result from poor allocation and risk management decisions. We have nationalised the losses from Bear Stearns through a transfer of risk on to the federal government’s balance sheet and have now nationalised the losses generated by Fannie’s and Freddie’s poor management and functionally taken $5,000bn in obligations on to the government’s balance sheet. This has been done even though every equity or debt offering of Fannie and Freddie explicitly states that these “are not guaranteed by the US and do not constitute an obligation of the US or any agency or instrumentality thereof other than” of Fannie or Freddie.

By the time we are finished with this tragic period in US economic history, the government is likely to have to choose whether to do the same for at least one more large bank, investment bank, bond insurer, mortgage insurer, multiple large regional bank, airline or car manufacturer. Given the choices we have seen from officials, who obviously have little faith in the ability of capital markets or our system of law, we will see the continued nationalisation of bad assets, placing the burden on the shoulders of the already overburdened American taxpayer.

This commitment by misguided officials to print more money, to stoke the embers of inflation and to debase further our already hobbled currency invites foreign investors to pick through our assets and buy our remaining strong businesses (Anheuser Busch) on the cheap. As the strength of our remaining industries is further weakened, along with taxpayers’ buying power, it will become increasingly necessary, as a matter of survival, for American workers to demand increases in their wages.

While some might applaud the government’s policy action, it will prevent the rational and orderly repricing of over inflated assets, ensure they remain overvalued, uneconomic and unaffordable to a populous that will see an increasing percentage of their wages allocated for the support of our national debt. We have done this without forcing the disgorgement of undeserved gains by managements and without replacing managements who are now controlling government “owned” businesses.

The same economists who have repeatedly argued efficient market theory have chosen this path. Instead of protecting those who made bad bets, we should use our rule of law to address the situation. That would mean we allow weak players either to fail or to reorganise through an orderly transfer of good assets from weak hands to strong hands. This would protect the once-mighty US dollar and affect the necessary and repricing of assets to sustainable equilibrium. Doing so would also decrease moral hazard and send a strong message of faith in our great system as the model for global financial advancement.

There is another option in relation to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Rather than making the taxpayer liable for debts the debts of the government-sponsored enterprises, it would be more sensible to effect a smooth, prepackaged reorganisation plan. This could be done quite simply and would strengthen the GSEs’ ability to meet their congressionally mandated purpose of supporting liquidity in the secondary mortgage market.

The core of the GSEs’ mission is to purchase mortgages from mortgage originators, charge a guarantee fee to issuers to protect their ability to stand behind these loans, and securitise these mortgage-backed securities with assurances to MBS holders they would receive 100 per cent of their anticipated returns. To this end the GSEs have guaranteed $3,500bn in mortgage-backed securities These securities are backed by real housing assets and there is little question that, assuming they are well serviced, there will be relatively little loss over a longer period.

As part of a prepackaged reorganisation the government could explicitly assure MBS investors they will receive all of their guaranteed interest payments. Instead of giving ineffective management a line of credit, Treasury could provide the GSEs’ regulator with a line of credit used to assure timely payments on these obligations. This is the tool that Treasury provides the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with to sort out failed banks. Over time that line will be repaid by the running-off of the portfolios, active servicing of mortgages and through payment of claims by private mortgage insurers who guaranteed first losses on GSE mortgages. Because these debts are core to the GSEs’ social mission and real assets back these debts, this would be an appropriate resolution.

The next step would create approximately $150bn in new equity capital and enable to GSEs, without governmental support, to achieve more fully their chartered mission.

Over the past decade the GSEs have increasingly used their portfolios to speculate in aircraft leasing, manufactured housing, interest-only mortgages and other securities they are specifically prohibited from buying as part of their mission. In recent years, through these portfolios they funded nearly 50 per cent of the riskier private label Alt-A mortgage market, invested in aircraft lease securities, manufactured housing and other assets that leveraged them into trouble. To achieve this speculative, hedge fund-like growth they issued almost $1,500bn of senior corporate debt. By their investments, debt buyers supported speculation in non-mission-related activities and did so with a clear understanding they were funding non-mission-related activities. They also knew GSE debt was explicitly not an obligation of the US taxpayer and that was repeated constantly by the government and the companies.

In exchange for their current debt, these holders should receive 90 cents on the dollar of new, long-dated, senior debt in the companies and 10 cents of new subordinated debt. The companies would then have enough capital to support their core, chartered mission and could increase the social returns and financial returns of investors in their core mission. This approach would send a very strong signal, from the government, that investors fully consider the risks of bad asset allocation. It would almost certainly strengthen the dollar. Though it would cause pain for equity and subordinated debt investors, those investors received the majority of returns over the past several years and, in our great system, they are supposed to be subordinated.

The writer is managing director of research firm Graham Fisher