“Pay as you go” tariffs have become commonplace. Now the idea of “pay as you don’t go” seems to be catching on in the boardroom. This week, Royal Dutch Shell forced through a proposal to pay bonuses to three executives just to stay in their jobs, even though investors holding almost half its voting shares failed to back the plan. Back in 2005, when software company Misys had to withdraw its retention proposals in the face of shareholder resistance, such payments were a UK novelty. It is a move in the wrong direction that their use is more widespread.

Shell’s scheme for the three frontrunners to become chief executive next year is a particularly unappealing example of the genre. There was not enough consultation with shareholders. This reflects badly on the board, whether it realised the hostility that might be provoked or was oblivious to it. And performance conditions play no part in the award. The remuneration report merely refers to the importance of continuity in a business that is capital intensive and geared to the long term. No wonder so many investors were unpersuaded.